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JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW:




Judicial performance review in Colorado is the most sophisti-
cated method in the nation for providing information to voters in
judicial retention elections.1  Colorado has had a commission-based
appointive system for judges––with the judges subject to periodic
non-contested retention elections––for forty years.  In the mid-
1980s, some in Colorado thought that retention elections did not
provide voters with enough information to hold judges accounta-
ble, and they sought to return the selection of judges to contested
partisan elections.  The performance review concept was a re-
sponse to the call for more public accountability.  But public ac-
countability in Colorado––advanced by a commission without
partisan balance––may encroach on judicial independence.2
This Article focuses on the role of judicial performance commis-
sions that provide information to voters before non-contested re-
tention elections for appointed judges.  A performance commission
might serve as a substitute for retention elections.  But given the
political climate in Colorado, where judges are subject to frequent
public criticism, it is highly unlikely that retention elections, en-
shrined in the state constitution, will be replaced with periodic
commission review.  Questions that this Article will address in-
clude the following:
* Jean Dubofsky is a member of the state Judicial Performance Review Com-
mission in Colorado.  She was a justice on the Colorado Supreme Court from 1979
until 1987.  She has had an appellate practice since 1989.  She graduated from
Harvard Law School in 1967.
1. See UNIV. OF DENVER, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., SHARED EXPECTATIONS, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT 20-56 (2006),
available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/docs/jpe-final-report.pdf.
2. The 2006 training manual for the commissions on judicial performance de-
clares that Colorado’s judicial merit selection and evaluation system “helps ensure
judicial independence” and “promote[s] the judiciary’s accountability to the public.”
According to the manual, judicial independence “provides a check and balance on the
political (the legislature and the executive) branches of government.” STATE OF COL-
ORADO, COMMISSIONS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE: TRAINING 2006, at 6-7 (2006)
[hereinafter TRAINING 2006].
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1. Who appoints the members of a judicial performance com-
mission and should partisan balance be required?
2. What should commission members’ qualifications be?
3. What are the appropriate criteria for evaluation of a judge’s
performance?
4. How does a commission obtain information about a judge?
5. What is done with the information obtained by the
commission?
6. Should performance review include retired judges or magis-
trates who serve as-needed?
7. What kind of staffing and training is available for commission-
ers and who pays for it?
8. Does a performance review get rid of bad judges and assist
voters in retaining good judges?
9. Should judges be subject to term limits?
10. To what degree does any performance evaluation limit judi-
cial independence?
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION-BASED JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROCESS IN COLORADO
Before discussing the role of judicial performance commissions,
this Article describes the initial selection process for most judges in
Colorado.3  In 1966, Colorado voters adopted an amendment to
the state constitution that provides an appointive process to select
state court judges, replacing their direct election.4  The appointive
process (called a “modified Missouri Plan”5) consists of a state-
wide appellate judicial nominating commission (“the supreme
court nominating commission”) and nominating commissions for
county and district court trial judges in each judicial district (“the
3. Municipal court judges and Denver County Court judges are not selected by
this process. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (governing selection process for Denver
County Court); art. VI, § 1, art. XX, § 6(c) (governing selection process for municipal
courts); Hardamon v. Mun. Court in and for City of Boulder, 497 P.2d 1000, 1002
(Colo. 1972) (holding that home rule cities are constitutionally empowered to provide
for judges, elected or appointed, who consider issues that are local or municipal in
nature).
4. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 455 (amending COLO. CONST.
art. VI).  The League of Women Voters, the Colorado Bar Association, and the Colo-
rado Medical Society initiated the amendment; their success capped a twenty-six year
effort to remove judges from contested elections.  Gregory J. Hobbs, Colorado Judi-
cial Merit Selection––A Well-Deserved 40th Anniversary Celebration, COLO. LAW.,
Apr. 2006, at 13, 13-14, 17.
5. Hobbs, supra note 4, at 14.
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district nominating comissions”).6  For each judicial vacancy, a
nominating commission sends two or three names selected from
those who have applied for the position to the governor, who
makes the final selection.7
The supreme court nominating commission consists of a lawyer
and a lay person from each congressional district8 and an addi-
tional lay person,9 with the chief justice as the ex officio chair.10
The district nominating commissions each have three attorney
members and four lay members, all of whom reside in the judicial
district, with one of the six justices of the state supreme court act-
ing as the ex officio chair.11  The governor, the attorney general,
and the chief justice select the lawyer members of each commission
by majority vote, and the governor selects the lay members.12  No
more than one-half of the commission members plus one can be
members of the same political party13 and all commission members
serve a term of six years.14  The commissions rely on staffing from
the supreme court and the state court administrator’s office, and
receive some training provided by the state court administrator.15
When a judicial vacancy occurs, any person who meets the mini-
mum qualifications to be a judge may file an application with the
ex officio chair of the commission.16  Immediately following inter-
6. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24.
7. Id.  The supreme court nominating commission must send three names to the
governor for appellate court vacancies; district nominating commissions may send two
or three names for county or district court vacancies. Id.
8. Colorado currently has seven congressional districts.  Colo. Dep’t of Educ.,
Colorado Congressional District Map, http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdeboard/bdmap.
htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2006).
9. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(2).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 24(3).
12. Id. § 24(4).
13. Id. §§ 24(2)-(3).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Colorado Judicial Branch’s Judicial Vacancies and Appointments, http://
www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/vacancy.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).  The appli-
cation is on a form provided by the supreme court and must be accompanied by let-
ters of reference. See Judicial Nominating Comm’n, Application for Colorado State
Court Judgeship, available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/vacancy.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2007).  The commission selects the applicants whom it wishes to interview
and conducts an interview, usually about thirty minutes, for each of the selected appli-
cants.  Some commissions prepare questions in advance; others conduct interviews on
an ad hoc basis.  There are no constitutional or statutory guidelines with respect to
what the commissions are to consider.
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views with the applicants, the commission votes on the names of
two or three candidates to send to the governor.17
For many years, the entire nominating process was confidential
by custom, as it was thought that confidentiality protected the law
practices of those applicants who were not selected.  For about
twenty years following this period of confidentiality, the commis-
sion chair announced the names of the two or three nominees
when the governor received the names.  More recently, the names
of those who apply often become public knowledge.  Members of
the nominating commissions call references listed in applications,
and applicants encourage their supporters to contact the members
of the commission.  The nominees also organize campaigns to
lobby the governor, as the governor or his staff usually interviews
each of the nominees and his office conducts an independent check
on their qualifications.
For the most recent state supreme court appointment, the former
chief counsel to the governor (who is in the last year of eight years
in office) suggested two people whom she said the governor would
like to see nominated.18  Because the governor appointed, or had a
hand in appointing, all of the members of the appellate nominating
commission, it was not surprising that two of the three names for-
warded to the governor, following the interviews, were the names
his former counsel suggested.
The nomination and selection process moves quickly.  The nomi-
nating commissions have no more than thirty days after a judge’s
death, retirement, tender of resignation, or removal from office to
submit a list of nominees to the governor.19  If the governor fails to
make an appointment within fifteen days from the date the list is
submitted to him, the chief justice of the supreme court has fifteen
days to make the appointment.20
After a judge serves a provisional term of at least two years, the
judge’s name (if the judge files a declaration of intent to run for
another term) will appear on the statewide ballot (if the judge
serves on an appellate court) or on a county or district ballot (if the
judge serves on the trial bench).21  Voters determine by majority
17. See generally Press Release, Colorado Judicial Branch, Judicial Selection and
Retention in Colorado (Apr. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Judicial Selection Press Release],
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/notices/judicial_facts_4-04.doc.
18. Howard Pankratz, High Court Choices Lining Up, DENV. POST, Dec. 7, 2005,
at B-02.
19. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 20(1).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 25.
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vote if the named judge shall be retained in office for a term of
years (four years for county judges, six years for district judges,
eight years for appellate judges, and ten years for supreme court
justices).22  There is no limit on the number of times the judge may
stand for retention, however, the Colorado Constitution requires a
judge to retire at age seventy-two.23
The constitutional amendment approved by voters in 1966 to re-
place the contested election of judges included the establishment of
a separate commission on judicial qualifications.24  In 1982, the vot-
ers amended the constitution to rename the commission (it became
the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline) and to change its
structure.25  The Commission on Judicial Discipline26 can recom-
mend removal or discipline of a state judge for willful misconduct
in office, willful or persistent failure to perform judicial duties, in-
temperance, or violation of the Colorado Code of Judicial Con-
duct, and recommend retirement for disability interfering with the
performance of judicial duties.27  The supreme court determines
whether to accept the Commission’s recommendation.28
The judicial discipline commission’s proceedings in individual
cases are confidential, however, the commission’s recommendation
that a judge be removed from office is not confidential after it is
filed with the supreme court.29  The commission’s annual report re-
flects that over the past thirty-nine years, twenty-four judges have
been ordered to retire due to a disability, the commission has is-
sued 166 private letters of admonition, reprimand, or censure
against judges, and forty-seven judges have resigned during com-
mission investigations.30  Although on average six judges per year
have been subject to commission action, it appears that no judge
has been publicly sanctioned for wrongful conduct.31
22. Id. §§ 7, 10(2), 16, 25; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-104 (2005).
23. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(1).
24. Colo. Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, 2005 Annual Report, COLO. LAW., June
2006, at 6, 15.
25. Id.
26. The Commission members include two county court judges and two district
court judges, who are selected by the supreme court, and two attorneys and four lay
persons, who are selected by the governor and subject to confirmation by the senate.
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(a).
27. Id. § 23(3)(d).
28. Id. § 23(3)(f).
29. Id. § 23(3)(g); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-401 to -402 (2001).
30. Colo. Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, supra note 24, at 18.
31. Id.
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The judicial discipline commission was not intended to replace
impeachment of a judge.32  In Colorado, the impeachment process
for a public official begins in the House of Representatives by ma-
jority vote; after trial in the Senate, conviction requires a two-
thirds vote.33  A judge has not been impeached in Colorado in
more than sixty-five years.34
II. AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW
IN COLORADO
During the early 1980s, there were several efforts to return
judges to elected politics.35  In response, the state supreme court
formed a committee of prominent attorneys to recommend how
voters might receive more information about the judges who were
on the ballot.  The court accepted the committee’s recommenda-
tion to establish a statewide judicial performance commission to
prepare information about each judge to be disseminated to vot-
ers.36  Many judges opposed the idea, particularly because they
were concerned about losing discretion over the length of prison
sentences in individual cases if systemwide information revealed
disparities in sentencing.37
32. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(i).
33. Id. art. XIII, § 1.
34. Although impeachment had not been used in Colorado since 1938, a Colorado
representative introduced a resolution to impeach a Denver district court judge in
March 2004.  Editorial, Prudence Prevails for Judge, DENV. POST, Apr. 29, 2004, at B-
06.  The representative was aided by Focus on the Family, a Christian ministry based
in Colorado Springs, and sought to impeach the judge for his decision in a child cus-
tody case involving two lesbians who had split up.  Chris Frates, GOP Criticizes
Group’s Push to Impeach Judge, DENV. POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at B-02.  One of the two
women embraced religious views that condemn homosexuality.  Editorial, Impeaching
Judge Extreme, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 20, 2004, at C-15.  After awarding joint
custody, the judge ordered the adoptive mother who had renounced homosexuality
not to expose the child to any homophobic religious teachings. Id.  The House Judici-
ary Committee blocked the impeachment effort, but the representative said that he
had conveyed a message to rein in judges from making law.  Arthur Kane, Panel Ref-
uses to Impeach Judge, DENV. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at B-01.
35. Judicial Selection in the States, History of Judicial Selection Reform, http://
www.ajs.org/js/CO_history.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
36. Unpublished report to the Colorado Supreme Court from a commission
chaired by Denver attorney Daniel S. Hoffman.  The author, as a justice on the su-
preme court at that time, had a role in the court’s acceptance of the recommendation.
37. Conversations that the author had with judges around the state when she was
a justice on the supreme court and was working on obtaining approval of a judicial
performance commission support this anecdotal data.
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The legislature codified the judicial performance commission
concept in 1988.38  The legislation created a statewide commission
on judicial performance, which evaluates the appellate court judges
and oversees the evaluation of county and district court trial judges
by a judicial performance commission in each judicial district.39
The state commission, however, may not substitute its evaluation
for that of the local commission.40  The ten members on the state
commission and the ten members of each district commission are
appointed by the legislative leadership, the governor, and the chief
justice.  The speaker of the house and the president of the senate
each appoints one lawyer and one lay person, and the governor
and the chief justice each appoints one lawyer and two lay per-
sons.41  Commission members may serve two four-year terms.42
By statute, the commissions consider the following criteria, if rel-
evant, in evaluating judges: integrity; knowledge and understand-
ing of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law; communication
skills; preparation, attentiveness, and control over judicial proceed-
ings; sentencing practices; docket management and prompt case
disposition; administrative skills; punctuality; effectiveness in work-
ing with participants in the judicial process; and service to the legal
profession and the public.43  The state court administrator collects
computerized information about each case filed in all state courts.
The information collected includes the names and addresses of the
litigants, their attorneys, court personnel, and––if pertinent––the
names and addresses of jurors and victims of crime.44
An opinion pollster, using questionnaires developed by the state
commission, surveys lawyers, jurors, litigants, law enforcement per-
sonnel, district attorneys and public defenders, employees of local
departments of social services, and victims of crime who have ap-
peared before each judge, and collects information about how the
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-101 (2005).  The law providing for the judicial per-
formance review process will expire on June 30, 2009, unless renewed by the legisla-
ture. Id. § 13-5.5-109.
39. Id. § 13-5.5-103.
40. Id. § 13-5.5-101.
41. Id. §§ 13-5.5-102, -104.
42. Id. §§ 13-5.5-102(b), -104(b).
43. Id. § 13-5.5-103(1)(a).  The commissions are not limited to the specified crite-
ria. Id.
44. RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, rule 2(a),
available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/main.cfm?webdiv=529&top=182
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007) [hereinafter RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS].
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judge meets the above criteria.45  The pollster sends the surveys to
randomly selected persons from each category who have appeared
in each judge’s courtroom.46
Before participating in the evaluation of a judge, each commis-
sion member must attend a biannual training session.47  The com-
missions are required to interview each judge up for retention48
and may conduct public hearings to solicit comments on the judges
being evaluated.49  In addition, the commissions receive informa-
tion concerning the caseload and types of cases for each judge50
and each judge prepares a self-evaluation on a form prepared by
the state commission.51  Finally, each commission member is to
make at least one unannounced visit to the courtroom to observe
the judge being evaluated.52
The results of the survey, courtroom observations by the mem-
bers of the commission, and interviews with the judge, as well as
people connected to the court system, assist each commission in
determining whether to recommend retention of a judge by the
electorate.53  The commission’s recommendation, as well as a nar-
rative profile written by the commission54 for each judge on the
ballot in a given year appears in the “blue book,” the publication
issued by the legislative staff to explain initiated measures that will
appear on the ballot.55  If a commission recommends “do not re-
tain” for a particular judge, the judge may campaign for
retention.56
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-103(b); RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra
note 44, rule 2(a).  The independent firm conducting the survey statistically analyzes
the data collected.  RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 7.  Written
comments from the survey are given to the commissions verbatim. Id.
46. RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 2(a).
47. Id. rule 6.
48. Id. rule 11.
49. Id. rule 2(f).
50. Id. rule 2(c).
51. Id. rule 2(g).
52. Id. rule 2(h).
53. The rules recommend that a judge who receives less than an average of 2.0 in
response to survey questionnaires (where judges are rated on a scale of zero to four,
with four being the highest rating) should receive a “do not retain” recommendation,
subject to a number of exceptions. Id. rule 13(b).
54. If a judge chooses to reply to criticism, the judge’s reply becomes part of the
narrative, subject to the judge’s right to have it removed. Id. rule 15(b).
55. The ballot information booklet is prepared under COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-
124.5 (2000).
56. Under Canon 7(b) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge who is a
candidate for retention in office may engage in campaign activity if there is active
opposition to her retention in office. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Ca-
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A commission may issue “no opinion” on retention if the com-
mission believes that it has insufficient information to make a rec-
ommendation.57  If a commission has “no opinion,” the
commission must explain in writing (for publication in the “blue
book”) why it has come to that conclusion.58  The statute does not
address whether a judge who receives “no opinion” is entitled to
campaign for retention.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
COMMISSIONS IN BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IS MIXED
The various forms that a judicial performance commission can
take may increase public accountability at the expense of judicial
independence.  The balance between the two is affected by the
considerations discussed in question and answer format below.
Who appoints the members of a judicial performance
commission?  Should there be partisan balance
on a commission?
The effectiveness of a judicial performance commission is depen-
dent primarily on who its members are.  The primary structural
problem with the Colorado judicial performance commissions is
that the appointing authorities have complete control over the po-
litical make-up of the commissions, as there is no requirement for
partisan balance.  Thus, the commission membership depends upon
the political affiliation of the appointing authorities.  When the
governor and the leadership of the state senate and the state house
of representatives are from the same political party, as has been
the case for four of the past eight years, they have the right to ap-
point seven members of each commission, and commission mem-
bership has been heavily weighted toward that party.59  In contrast,
non 7(b), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/pubed/canons.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2007).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-106(1)(b), -106(2)(b) (2005); RULES GOVERNING
COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rules 13(d), 14.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-106(2)(b).
59. The chief justice appoints the remaining three members of each commission;
her appointments have provided the political balance.  Were she inclined to appoint
members of the governor’s political party that controls the legislature, all the mem-
bers of the performance commission could be affiliated with a single party.  The cur-
rent chair of the state judicial performance commission has suggested that the
attorney general, who is the only lawyer elected by the citizens state-wide, should
make the appointments now made by the chief justice.  Paul Farley, Speakout: Term
Limits for Judges Unnecessary, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 3, 2006, at 34A.  The attor-
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no more than one-half of the judicial nominating commission’s
members plus one may be members of the same political party.60
The subsequent temptation to be more critical of judges who
were appointed when the governor was of the opposing party has
proved irresistible for some commissions.61  The impact on judicial
independence is the consequent suggestion to judges that they
should rule in a way that is acceptable to the dominant political
membership on the performance commission.  Judges might be re-
moved from partisan elections, but depending upon the partisan
make-up of the performance commission, they may remain subject
to political pressure (public accountability) in ways that reduce
their independence.
The perceived importance of the political make-up of the com-
missions can cause trouble, as reflected in a recent Colorado Su-
preme Court decision, Romanoff v. State Commission on Judicial
Performance.62 Romanoff arose from a dispute over the member-
ship of the state judicial performance commission.  In November
2004, the Democrats won control of both houses of the state legis-
lature.63  In early 2005, one day before the new Democratic leader-
ship was to take office, the outgoing conservative Republican
president of the Senate and the outgoing conservative Republican
speaker of the House replaced two members of the commission (a
lawyer who is a Democrat and a lawyer who is a moderate Repub-
lican) with two conservative Republican attorneys.64  The new
Democratic leadership rescinded the appointments and restored to
their positions the two lawyers who had been on the commission.65
The conflicting appointments brought the work of the commis-
sion to a standstill.66  The supreme court, using its power to issue
ney general, however, is elected by partisan vote, and if the attorney general were to
replace the chief justice as an appointing authority, all of the members of the commis-
sion could have the same political affiliation unless the law is changed to require par-
tisan balance.
60. COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 24(2)-(3).
61. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing a voter initiative that
would remove all of the appellate judges appointed by the prior governor).
62. 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).
63. Id. at 185.
64. Id.  The former president of the Senate has been a frequent critic of judges; he
initiated a proposed constitutional amendment that would have established term lim-
its for appellate judges. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
65. Romanoff, 126 P.3d at 185.
66. Id. at 184.
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writs of quo warranto,67 held that the terms of the lawyers who had
been restored to the commission by the Democratic leadership had
expired.68  Although the restored lawyers did not complete their
four-year terms, earlier appointments to the commission by the
legislative leadership were made in violation of the statutory
scheme for staggered terms.69  According to the court, the Republi-
can appointing authority made one of the two appointments in an
untimely manner, and the commission was to select the replace-
ment for the Democratic lawyer.70  The commission, dominated by
Republicans, selected the Republican lawyer whose appointment
was untimely.
Political considerations can be ameliorated if commission mem-
bers are appointed by individuals not elected to political office.  In
Colorado before 1988, judicial performance review was conducted
by bar associations.71  Performance review by attorneys is less
likely to be swayed by public opinion because attorneys are more
likely to understand the importance of judicial independence.  At-
torneys are also more likely to provide sophisticated review of judi-
cial performance.
The judicial performance commission concept in Colorado, how-
ever, was designed to provide more public input, and thus account-
ability, by expanding review beyond attorneys acting through bar
associations.  It is not surprising that the lay members of some of
the commissions reflect generalized public opposition to so-called
“activist judges.”72  At the same time, one of the strengths of the
judicial performance concept is that a judge who makes a politi-
cally unpopular decision required by statute or case law may find
support for retention from a judicial performance commission.
When the commission is perceived as having more lay members
than attorney members, the general public may be more willing to
accept its recommendation.
67. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.  A writ of quo warranto is a common law writ
“designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally entitled to do so.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Romanoff, 126 P.3d at 192.
69. Id. at 189.
70. Id. at 192.
71. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Judicial Selection in Colorado––Fact Sheet, Fair and Impar-
tial Courts, http://www.cobar.org/group/index.cfm?category=2488&EntityID=cpcc
(last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
72. See, e.g., Richard L. Gabriel, Term Limits for Judges: Still a Bad Idea,  Feb. 6,
2006, http://www.coloradojudicialinstitute.org/downloads/ (select file titled “Term
Limits Still a . .> 08-Aug-2006”).
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Nevertheless, judicial reviews by bar associations could be ex-
panded; non-attorney input could come from a number of organi-
zations such as the League of Women Voters, Common Cause,
business organizations, service clubs, labor unions, and religious
groups.  The concept of a process without members appointed by
elected officials, however, creates a number of additional
problems.  Which bar associations participate?  What organizations
participate?  And where does the money come from to provide in-
formation compiled by private groups to the general public?
In sum, who appoints the members of a judicial performance
commission may not be as important as a requirement that the
commission have partisan balance.  Changes in the elected officials
who appoint commission members may change the composition of
commission membership, but one party could not dominate by
more than a single vote if appointments by elected officials were
restrained by the need to retain partisan balance.  It may be sim-
pler to have public accountability come by way of elected officials
appointing the persons who provide the written reviews of the
judges than it would be to enumerate the various organizations
that could participate in such a review.
Should there be racial, ethnic, gender, age, religious,
or experience diversity on a commission?
What are the qualifications required for appointment
to a commission?
If a prosecutor is a member of a commission, should the
commission also include a public defender?
Should there be term limits for the members of the commission?
In addition to not requiring partisan diversity, the statute that
creates judicial performance commissions in Colorado does not re-
quire racial, ethnic, gender, religious, or geographic diversity.73  At
present, the appointments to the state commission reflect some
gender, racial, and geographic diversity.  The statute could en-
courage appointing authorities to consider diversity when making
commission appointments.
Even though attorneys comprise a minority of performance com-
mission members, they tend to dominate a commission’s work.74
Some attorney commission members have had no experience in
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-102 (2005).
74. This statement is based on the author’s extensive experience as a member of
the state judicial performance commission and as the trainer of members of local
commissions.
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court, and their sophistication about the workings of the court sys-
tem is little more than that of the average lay person.  The commis-
sion process can be improved if attorney members are required to
have had experience in the court whose judges they evaluate, with
attorney members of the state commission required to have either
appellate or trial court experience, and attorney members of local
commissions required to have had experience in the local trial
courts.  Lay members might be required to have some working
knowledge of the court system, either as a litigant or a member of a
group that works with or monitors the judicial process.75
Several local commissions have elected district attorneys as
members.76  The presence of an elected district attorney might en-
courage judges to favor the prosecutor in criminal cases, or at least
create a public assumption that the judge will favor the prosecutor
because the prosecutor has a direct vote in recommending a
judge’s retention by the electorate.  At the same time, a prosecutor
knows more about the judges in the district than anyone else be-
cause of the high percentage of criminal cases heard by judges and
because the elected district attorney would have an employee on a
near-daily basis in each judge’s courtroom.  If an elected district
attorney (or an assistant district attorney) serves on a judicial per-
formance commission, one could insist that a public defender also
be a member of the commission.77  But then, must one of the slots
go to a domestic relations attorney, a plaintiff’s personal-injury at-
torney, or an insurance defense counsel?  In some areas of the
state, there are few lawyers with courtroom experience other than
the district attorneys and public defenders.  Given public interest in
criminal convictions and the length of prison sentences, the pres-
ence of an elected district attorney on a commission might increase
the perception that judges are publicly accountable.
The Colorado judicial performance commission statute limits
commission members to two four-year terms.78  Term limits are im-
portant if elected officials are to have input into the make-up of the
75. Senate confirmation of the legislative and gubernatorial appointments might
weed out unqualified commission selections, but the confirmation process would be
unwieldy unless limited to state commission members.
76. For example, the district attorney in El Paso County (Colorado Springs),
elected in 2004, is also a member of the judicial performance commission that evalu-
ates El Paso County judges.  Office of the District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District,
http://dao.elpasoco.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
77. Regardless of whether a district attorney or a public defender is a member of a
commission, performance commission surveys are sent to district attorneys and public
defenders. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-103(1)(b) (2006).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-102(b), -104(b) (2005).
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commissions.  Moreover, term limits allow more people to partici-
pate in judicial performance review, and the more people with a
chance to participate in the judicial process, the more people who
likely will become supporters of the commission-based appointive
system for judges and judicial independence.
What are the appropriate criteria for evaluation of a judge’s
performance: i.e., demeanor, patience, tolerance,
willingness to work hard, ability to deal with complex issues,
knowledge of substantive and procedural law, integrity,
control over judicial proceedings, docket management skills,
attentiveness, communication skills, and public service?
Should sentencing practices be included?
The evaluations by judicial performance commissions assist vot-
ers in deciding which judges to retain and provide the judges with
information to help them improve their performance.  The Colo-
rado judicial performance statute lists the qualities and skills that
trial and appellate judges should have, including “integrity, knowl-
edge and understanding of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary
law; communications skills; preparation, attentiveness, and control
over judicial proceedings; sentencing practices; docket manage-
ment and prompt case disposition; administrative skills; punctual-
ity; effectiveness in working with participants in the judicial
process; and service to the legal profession and the public.”79  The
surveys sent to court participants are more detailed.80
Many of the necessary personal qualities and skills of trial and
appellate judges are significantly different.  For example, a trial
court judge interacts with the public far more than an appellate
judge does, and patience, good communication, and docket man-
79. Id. § 13-5.5-103(1)(a).
80. The surveys for non-attorney court participants ask them to evaluate trial
judges on demeanor, fairness, communications, diligence, and application of law.  The
surveys for attorneys ask them to evaluate trial judges on case management; applica-
tion and knowledge of law, including issuing consistent sentences in criminal cases
when the circumstances are similar; communications; demeanor; and diligence.  Both
surveys have numerous questions within each of the topics.  The appellate question-
naire for attorneys is shorter and emphasizes evaluation of judicial opinions that ade-
quately explain the basis of the court’s decision and that refrain from reaching issues
that need not be decided.  A separate questionnaire for the evaluation of appellate
judges is sent to trial judges.  All of the surveys ask the evaluator to provide written
comments about the judge being evaluated.  The form of the surveys can be found at
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, The Honorable Michael K. Singer, 2006 Judicial
Performance Survey, 13th Judicial District, at 93-96 (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.co
judicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/Dst13MichaelKSinger.pdf [hereinafter
Singer Survey].
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agement skills are more important.  For an appellate judge, the
abilities to research and write well and to work in a collegial setting
are more important.
It is difficult for a judicial performance commission to assess the
collegial work of appellate judges because the work is confidential
and done as members of a panel.  Moreover, it is difficult for a
commission to evaluate the opinions authored by a particular ap-
pellate judge for writing ability and research skills because of the
unacknowledged assistance to appellate judges by law clerks and
staff attorneys.  In addition, the quality of the lawyering in a partic-
ular case, both at the trial and appellate level, constrains the ability
of an appellate judge to reach what might be a more sensible result.
The best way to evaluate an appellate judge may be by looking at
the quality of the judge’s work over a broad range of cases; trial
court judges, who read many of an appellate court’s decisions, may
be in a better position to make such an assessment than are the
attorneys who may focus only on cases in their area of practice.81
Criminal sentencing is an important aspect of judicial accounta-
bility to the general public.  Because stories about crime sell news-
papers (and television news programs), the public tends to think
that the only cases handled by judges are criminal cases.  If a sen-
tence seems too lenient in a publicized criminal case, the average
voter may conclude that the judge who did not punish the defen-
dant sufficiently is someone who should not be a judge.  Reflecting
public concern about criminal sentencing, the judicial performance
surveys for trial court judges ask “How biased do you think Judge
X is towards the defense or the prosecution?” and “How lenient or
harsh do you think the sentences handed down by Judge X are?”82
In order to be “tough” on crime, the Colorado legislature has
limited judicial discretion in sentencing by enacting mandatory
minimum sentences for many crimes.83  The problem with
mandatory minimum sentences is that they are fashioned as “one-
size-fits all.”  The harshness of sentencing schemes in particular
cases may be ameliorated by judicial discretion, but any judge who
reduces a sentence below the mandatory minimum risks being
81. As discussed below, trial court judges participate in the evaluation surveys of
appellate judges at a much higher rate than do attorneys. See infra note 96 and ac-
companying text.
82. See, e.g., Comm’n on Judicial Performance, The Honorable Marilyn Kay Leo-
nard, 2006 Judicial Performance Survey, 18th Judicial District, at 11-12 (Apr. 26,
2006), http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/Dst18MarilynKay
Leonard.pdf.
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(8) (2004).
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viewed as “too soft” on crime.  Consequently, many persons who
do not belong in prison for long periods of time may serve lengthy
prison terms.
“Sentencing practices” are not qualities or skills of a trial court
judge.  Rather, sentencing practices––if considered by a local com-
mission––reflect whether the judge imposes more lenient sentences
than the statutory mandatory sentence provision calls for or, where
statutes allow sentencing within a range of years, whether the judge
consistently sentences at the low or high end of the range.  The
rules promulgated by the state commission direct a district court
administrator to provide a local commission, upon request, with
the number of sentence modifications that a trial court judge has
made under the statute that provides mandatory minimum
sentences for persons convicted of enumerated violent crimes.84  If
a judge determines that a sentence below the mandatory minimum
is appropriate, the judge is required to notify the state court admin-
istrator of the unusual and extenuating circumstances that justified
the modification.85  Thus, when a local commission requests the in-
formation and the judge has imposed a sentence below the
mandatory minimum, the commission may view the judge as too
lenient.  The resulting reluctance of a judge to impose a lower sen-
tence where appropriate is a loss of judicial independence.
From whom is information about a judge obtained?
If surveys of courtroom participants are used, what are the
surveys for and how does a commission ensure their accuracy?
Should commissioners observe the judge in the courtroom
or hold public hearings?
Should performance commissions have access to information
about specific instances of misconduct or disability provided to a
judicial discipline commission?
Does a judge have an opportunity to reply to criticism?
The statute directs the state commission to develop surveys for
lawyers, jurors, litigants, law enforcement personnel, attorneys
with the district attorney’s and public defender’s offices, employees
of local departments of social services, victims of crime, other
judges, and court personnel.86  The surveys of participants in the
litigation process are the chief source of information about a
84. Id.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. §16-11-309(1)(a) (2006); RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS,
supra note 44, rule 2(c).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-103(1)(b).
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judge’s performance and are intended to provide objective infor-
mation.  The surveys in Colorado have been conducted by a well-
regarded pollster with many years’ experience surveying public
opinion.87
The state judicial department provides the pollster with the
names and addresses of people from its ICON data base88 who in
the past twelve months have been in the courtrooms of the judges
up for retention; where there are more than 400 potential respon-
dents, a random sample is drawn.89  The pollster mails each person
in the sample database an initial questionnaire with an introduc-
tory letter and a postage-paid return envelope.  Not more than two
questionnaires are sent to any one respondent, regardless of how
many times the respondent may have been in the courtrooms of
the judicial district or the appellate courts.  The response rate is
calculated as the number of completed questionnaires divided by
the number of eligible respondents who received a questionnaire.90
In 2006, over fifty percent of attorneys who received question-
naires responded.91  The response rate for non-attorneys was much
lower––thirty-three percent, with the highest percentage response
rate from employees of the court and jurors.92
The surveys used in Colorado do not distinguish, for example,
between court personnel and victims of crime; anyone who is not
an attorney answers the same questions.93  The survey forms direct
the person completing the questionnaire to grade the judge in each
of the listed areas; if the person does not have enough information,
the person is to mark “No Grade.”94  Nevertheless, the respondent
may base her answer on very limited exposure to the judge.  Al-
though respondents grade a judge with an “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” or
“F,” they are not all grading the same performance––the answers
of a respondent who saw a judge briefly at a sentencing proceeding
87. Talmey-Drake Res. & Strategy, Inc., Boulder, Colorado.
88. “ICON” is the Integrated Colorado On-Line Network, a computerized
database of court records used by the State Judicial Department.  Colorado Inte-
grated Criminal Justice Information System, http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/cicjis/
AgencySystems/agency-jud.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
89. See Singer Survey, supra note 80, at 2  (indicating that in 2006, Talmey-Drake
attempted to contact more than 75,000 people who had been in the courtrooms of the
judges facing a retention vote; more than 21,000 people responded––4,600 to the at-
torney survey and over 17,000 to the non-attorney survey).
90. Id. at 66-87.
91. Id. at 90.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 66-87.
94. See id.
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are given the same weight as those of a respondent who watched a
judge over the course of a multi-week trial.95  The answers from
relatively small numbers of attorneys to questions about the appel-
late judges may not be statistically sound; the far more numerous
answers from trial court judges, who often read all of the appellate
courts’ decisions, are more reliable.96
Commissions are reminded that the weight given to any group’s
survey results should be in relation to the proportion of group
members who completed the survey.97  For example, the commis-
sions are told that if only twenty of the 100 attorneys (selected ran-
domly) who appeared before a particular judge returned the
questionnaire, and twenty-five percent of those attorneys thought
that the judge was biased, the percentage may not be
representative.98
From answers to the questionnaires, a commission may be able
to focus on the judges who are not performing their jobs as they
should be.  The commission rules suggest that a judge who receives
more than an average of 2.0––a “C”––in response to questions in
the attorney and non-attorney surveys should be “strongly consid-
ered” for a recommendation of “Retain.”99  There are exceptions
to this suggestion: the judge has an unusually large caseload, the
judge has been on the bench a short time, the survey results are
inaccurate, or the judge receives an “overall retention rating of 80
percent or more of the combined percentage results of ‘strongly
recommend be retained in office’ or ‘somewhat recommend be re-
tained in office’ in either the attorney or non-attorney survey
results.”100
In addition to the persons to be surveyed,101 commissions may
interview persons who have appeared before the judge on a regular
basis.102  If a commission chooses to interview persons with profes-
sional contact with the judge, the commission must supply the
judge with a written summary of the substance of the interview that
preserves the anonymity of the interviewee.103  Commissions may
95. See id. at 89-96 (describing the methodology used in conducting the surveys).
96. Id.
97. TRAINING 2006, supra note 2, at 38.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id. at 24, rule 13(b).  The state commission has proposed a change in the rule
that would increase the average from 2.0 to 3.0, a “B.”  The rule change has not yet
been forwarded to the supreme court for approval.
100. Id. rule 13(b)(V).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5.5-103(1)(b) (West 2005).
102. See RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 2(d).
103. Id.
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also consider written information concerning the judge if the infor-
mation contains the author’s name and address.104
A commission may conduct a public hearing to solicit public
comment on the judges being evaluated.105  Experienced commis-
sioners tend to think that the public hearings are a waste of time.106
Often, the persons who appear are disgruntled domestic relations
litigants; a commission cannot review the substance of rulings in
domestic relations cases, or any other type of case, because such
review is for the appellate courts.107  If a judge shows bias based on
gender in domestic relations cases or is impatient with domestic
relations litigants, the surveys (and accompanying comments)
should provide sufficient information to replace what can be
learned in a public hearing.  If an individual litigant wishes to com-
plain to a judicial performance commission about a particular
judge, the complaint can be reviewed more efficiently if it is in
written form.  Nothing prevents the commission from interviewing
a complainant who first makes her complaint in writing.108
A commission can also obtain information from other sources
maintained by the state court administrator or the clerks of the
appellate courts.109  Such information includes the caseload and
types of cases for a particular judge, the number of trials to the
court, the number of jury trials before a judge, open case reports,
and case aging reports.  Additionally, each member of a commis-
sion is required to observe unannounced the proceedings in the
courtroom of at least one of the judges up for retention.110
Finally, each judge subject to review fills out a self-evaluation
form developed by the state commission.111  The form asks a judge
to assess her own legal ability, integrity, communication skills, judi-
cial temperament, administrative skills, settlement activities, and
overall performance.112  The judge is also asked to assess her com-
munity reputation, describe her judicial philosophy, and list
104. Id. rule 2(e).
105. Id. rule 2(f) (although the wording of the rule indicates only that commissions
“may” hold public hearings, the rules then state that “commissions are encouraged to
conduct” such hearings).
106. The author, as a member of the state commission, has heard from other state
commissioners, as well as from local commissioners, that hearings often are a waste of
time.
107. See supra note 106.
108. See Judicial Selection Press Release, supra note 17.
109. See RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 2(c).
110. Id. rule 2(h).
111. Id. rule 2(g).
112. Id.
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strengths, weaknesses, and goals for development.113  The informa-
tion provided by the self-evaluation form is useful for the interview
required of each judge, but the information––as well as any written
comments included with a survey––is not to be made public.114
The reason for confidentiality is to encourage a judge to be self-
critical.  Even so, judges’ own evaluations often are too self-serv-
ing; no one can possibly be as good as some judges seem to think
they are.
Judges have the opportunity to reply to criticism, both in writing
and during a second interview with the commissions.115  The reply
and second interview can be helpful to both the judge and the com-
mission because the judge will have a sense of the commission’s
concerns and can supply information that will make the evaluation
more accurate.  Some judges, however, are so defensive about their
performances that they have difficulty hearing the commissions’
concerns and responding in a way that will improve their
evaluations.
While one would think that information collected by the judicial
discipline commission would be particularly pertinent to evaluation
of judges, the judicial discipline commission’s research is confiden-
tial, and the discipline commission refuses to share any of its confi-
dential information about a judge who is up for retention with the
judicial performance commissions.116  Under the state constitution,
information gathered about a judge during a judicial discipline
commission investigation can be released to an evaluating govern-
ment agency only if the judge signs a waiver.117  The judicial per-
formance review commissions apparently have never sought
information concerning the conduct of a particular judge from the
judicial discipline commission by requesting the judge to sign a
waiver for purposes of a retention evaluation.
113. Id.
114. See id. rules 2(g), 8-10.
115. Id. rule 15.
116. The author knows of no case in Colorado in which the judicial discipline com-
mission’s research has been shared or released to a judicial performance commission;
the head of the judicial discipline commission thinks that the commission should not
share the information and no one has ever challenged him.
117. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(g); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-401, -402 (2006);
COLORADO RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, rule 6(c)(6) (2001).
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What is done with the information obtained?
How is it provided to voters in a manner that will be of
assistance before casting a retention vote?
Does the information collected help a judge improve
judicial performance?
Should mid-term evaluations be supplied to the public?
How much of the evaluative process should be confidential?
Each commission is charged with the responsibility of writing
narrative profiles for the judges subject to a retention vote; the task
cannot be delegated to a staff member.118  The content and style of
the profiles are inconsistent: some profiles provide more informa-
tion than others; some are written in such general terms that they
convey little sense of an individual judge’s strengths and weak-
nesses; some commissions believe that the profiles should contain a
significant amount of negative material while others believe that
judges who work hard should receive accolades.
Regardless of the content of the narrative profiles, not many vot-
ers read the “blue book” containing the narrative profiles that are
sent to the households of all registered voters.119  Voters probably
pay more attention to newspaper editorials.  Many voters do not
vote for the judges, either because they believe that they do not
know enough about an individual judge to cast an informed vote or
because the retention votes are near the end of what often are very
long ballots.120
If the performance commission review can avoid an adversarial
tone, the information provided by surveys and through interviews
of the judges can assist a judge in understanding how she is per-
ceived by others in the courtroom.  Judges in general receive very
little feedback about their performance because those persons who
are regularly in the courtroom may be dependent upon the judge’s
good will.  When the evaluation process is confidential, the infor-
mation given to the judge is more likely to be accurate (because
118. RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 14.
119. The 2006 blue book contains information about state-wide initiatives and ref-
erenda, as well as narrative profiles of the judges.  Information about judges begins at
page 101, and of those voters who read the blue book, few get to the judge narratives.
The profiles are available online at Commissions on Judicial Performance, Recom-
mendations for Judicial Retention, http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/retention-
list.cfm?year=2006 (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
120. In addition to partisan elected official races, ballots in Colorado can contain
numerous measures referred by the legislature or initiated by petition, as well as all of
the elections authorizing increased taxes or spending required by the Taxpayer’s Bill
of Rights. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20.
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critics will not be afraid to come forward) and more likely to effect
change (because judges are less likely to be overly defensive).
Beginning in 2008, the judicial performance commissions will
also evaluate judges mid-term in an effort to provide judges with
feedback about how a variety of court constituencies view their
performance with respect to the statutory criteria.121  Funds are
available to pay for interim surveys, but the volunteers who serve
on the performance commissions (and the attorneys and court per-
sonnel who fill out the surveys) may be reluctant to take on the
additional work.
Interim evaluations are most useful to new judges and to judges
who have become less patient because they have been on the
bench for a long time.  There is little reason to supply the interim
evaluations to the public; presumably the public needs information
about a judge only if the judge is on a retention ballot.
Should performance review include retired judges who serve
as-needed or magistrates?
Magistrates––appointed by the chief judge in each judicial dis-
trict––perform an increasing number of judicial tasks, especially in
fast-growing areas of the state.122  Magistrates are not subject to
retention elections, and the only oversight for magistrates has been
provided by chief judges.123  The judicial performance review stat-
ute provides that magistrates should be subject to performance re-
views in each odd-numbered year (the years when judges would
not be subject to review).124  The commissions have not begun to
evaluate magistrates, and again, volunteer commissioners may be
reluctant to take on the additional work of reviewing magistrates,
particularly in the largest judicial districts.
Retired judges serve on an as-needed basis.125  The chief justice
appoints them to the retired judges’ program, for which they re-
ceive an additional amount of pension and can serve until age
eighty-four.126  The state court administrator’s office matches a re-
tired judge with a judicial district that needs additional help for a
single day or for a particular case or series of matters.127  Retired
121. The state judicial performance commission has authorized interim surveys, to
be accomplished beginning in 2008.
122. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5-201 (2005).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 13-5.5-106(3)(a)(II).
125. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 5(3).
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-51-1105.
127. Judicial Selection Press Release, supra note 17.
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judges do not appear on retention ballots and are not subject to
any form of continuing performance review.128
What kind of staffing and training is available for commissioners
and who pays for it?
The executive director for the state commission provides training
materials and sessions, coordinates collection of survey data and
convening of commission meetings, transmits commission reports
for publication in the “blue book,” and makes sure that appoint-
ments to commissions are timely.129  The district administrator for
each judicial district staffs the district commissions.130  Activities of
the commissions are funded by an increase in docket fees, effective
June 6, 2003, collected in criminal cases131 and for traffic
infractions.132
The training materials and biannual training sessions are com-
prehensive, but they are not a substitute for a commission mem-
ber’s sophistication with respect to how courts work and should
work.  Individual commission members are not prevented from
speaking with local court officials and persons who appear regu-
larly in the courts about how the courts operate and how particular
judges are viewed, but individual self-training projects are not en-
couraged.133  Each commission is expected to conduct its work as
an entity, dependent upon the experience primarily of the attorney
members.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-101.
129. Id. § 13-5.5-103(1)(j).
130. Id. § 13-5.5-104(2).
131. Id. §§ 13-5.5-107, 13-32-105(1)(b).
132. Id. §§ 13-5.5-107, 42-4-1710(4)(a)(II).  Unexpended amounts in the judicial
performance cash fund at the end of a fiscal year are to remain in the fund unless the
chief justice of the supreme court reduces the amount of the uncommitted reserve in
the fund to meet constitutional limits on state spending. Id. §§ 13-5.5-107, 13-32-
105.5.
133. This observation is based on the author’s experience as a trainer of local com-
mission members.
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Does a performance review result in the over-retention of
incompetent or controversial judges?
Are more judges rejected by the voters if there are no
performance reviews?
Are capable judges who have been involved in controversial
cases protected from rejection by the voters if a performance
commission recommends that they be retained?
Very few judges have received a “do not retain” evaluation, and
even fewer have been rejected by the voters.  Between 1988 and
2004, 743 judges were reviewed;134  commissions recommended re-
tention for 714 judges, “do not retain” for fourteen,135  and offered
ten “no opinions.”136  Of the fourteen judges who were not recom-
mended for retention, the voters rejected only six of them.137
Rejection most often occurs in a small community, where the
judge may have ruled on a case (even a single divorce case) in a
manner that gave rise to significant criticism.  Often, judges who
believe that their evaluation will not be favorable choose not to
seek retention; the date by which a judge must decide whether to
seek retention is after the judge has been provided with the judicial
performance commission’s review, but before its recommendation
becomes public knowledge.138  Therefore, the number of “do not
retain” evaluations and subsequent voter rejections is not a true
measure of the effectiveness of the performance commission
evaluations.
Moreover, if the commission-based appointive system for judges
is working properly and judges are selected carefully, one would
expect that not many judges would be removed by the voters.
Sometimes the selection commissions cannot anticipate a person’s
judicial temperament or patience.  Sometimes judges themselves
will not know whether they will jump to decisions too quickly,
without listening to all sides of a case, or find themselves paralyzed
by indecision.  A performance review for judges who are intemper-
ate or indecisive may assist them in remedying their shortcomings,
or––if a particular judge has been unable to address such is-
sues––recommend that she not continue as a judge.




138. Judges must declare their intent to stand for retention not less than three
months prior to the general election. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
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Judges in general remain skeptical about performance reviews,
although a performance commission retention recommendation
can be helpful to a judge who has been subject to public criticism
for a decision in a controversial case.139  Judicial concern about
performance reviews is not completely misplaced.  A relatively
large percentage of the voters in a retention election votes “no”
because of a general public skepticism about judges.  This skepti-
cism has been fanned in recent years by public criticism of deci-
sions in particular cases: for example, the pledge of allegiance to
the flag case,140 the Terri Schiavo case,141 and high profile criminal
cases like the prosecution of O.J. Simpson.142  The legislature did
not require partisan balance on the judicial performance commis-
sions (as the voters did for nominating commissions),143 and in the
past few years, the governor and legislative leaders have appointed
as commission members libertarians and social conservatives who
want to increase public criticism of the judiciary.144
Should judges be subject to term limits?
If so, how long should a judge serve?
The former President of the State Senate proposed a constitu-
tional amendment that would have required appellate judges to be
subject to retention elections every four years and to serve no more
than ten years.145  The ten-year cap would have removed from the
supreme court five justices and from the court of appeals seven
judges who were appointed by the Democrat who left office as gov-
ernor nearly eight years ago.  The Colorado Bar Association led
139. The author, as a member of the state judicial performance commission, speaks
to groups of judges about performance review; she responds to skeptics by noting
cases where judges who have been assigned and decided controversial cases have later
been retained after favorable judicial performance reviews. See supra note 34.
140. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (overturning
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003)).
141. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
142. See Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  Simpson was
acquitted in the criminal case, so there is no reported decision. Id. at 582.
143. Fact Sheet, Colo. Bar Ass’n, Judicial Selection in Colorado: Fair and Impartial
Courts, http://www.cobar.org/Docs/judicialselection%2Epdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2007).
144. The author, as a member of the state judicial performance commission, partici-
pates in the training of members of local commissions; she has observed an increase in
the number of commission members who think that judicial performance commis-
sions should get rid of “activist judges.”
145. Proposed Constitutional Amendment for 2006 Ballot, Initiative #90, available
at http://www.cobar.org/Docs/BallotTitle90%2Epdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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the opposition to the proposal.146  Colorado voters rejected the
proposal on November 7, 2006.147
The Colorado Bar Association argues that the proposal for term
limits “reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the differences
in our three branches of government and the need for independent
courts.”148  Included in the bar association arguments are the fol-
lowing.  First, “accountability already exists” through the merit sys-
tem for appointment, judicial performance review, and retention
elections.149  Second, a maximum service of ten years is too short
for a judgeship applicant to give up a law practice.150  Third, term
limits that require a judge to be on the ballot so often interfere
with judicial independence, and the ten-year limit on service will
end productive careers of good judges too soon.151  Fourth, “just
because term limits are in place for . . . executive and legislative”
elected officials does not mean that term limits are appropriate for
judges, who “garner increased knowledge through years on the
bench” and who have the “power to rule only on cases brought
before the court.”152  Fifth, there is no valid non-partisan reason to
end the terms of all of the appellate judges who were appointed by
the prior governor.153
Granted, some judges remain on the bench too long.  It is easy to
lose patience with litigants whose problems seem petty or with rep-
etitious legal issues.  The judicial performance review system can
better address whether some judges have become arrogant or im-
patient.  There is no reason to adopt term limits, especially such
short limits, to remove all judges––the temperate as well as the
intemperate.
To what degree does any performance evaluation limit
judicial independence?
Performance review is justified when it is limited to a judge’s
demeanor or efficiency; it is not intended, however, to evaluate the
legal correctness of a judge’s decisions.  Performance review, if
146. Letter from Colo. Bar Ass’n to Its Members (June 28, 2006), available at http://
www.cobar.org/group/display.cfm?GenID=8712.
147. Howard Pankratz, Capping Judges’ Tenure is Rejected, DENV. POST, Nov. 8,
2006, at B-09.
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conducted in a non-partisan manner, should not limit judicial
independence.
Unfortunately, most public opposition to judges is now couched
as opposition to “activist judges.”  An “activist judge” is one who
has decided a case in a way that the critic does not like.154  The
disagreement is with the substance or result of the decision, the
very issues that judicial performance review is not intended to ad-
dress.155  Consequently, the concept of judicial performance review
may be at cross-purposes with the type of accountability that the
general public seeks.  The direct election of judges in contested
elections is seen as a means to give voters more control over their
government and to reverse decisions that a majority of the voters
do not like.
Whether the judicial performance commission form of public ac-
countability is sufficient to block additional efforts to return judges
to contested political elections remains to be seen.  The most re-
cent effort to cut back on judicial independence in Colorado was
the proposed constitutional amendment to create term limits for
state appellate judges.  The measure garnered enough signatures to
appear on the ballot, and in late September polling showed that
fifty-four percent of likely voters supported it.156  After a campaign
in which the proponents criticized “activist judges” and “runaway
courts,”157 a Colorado Bar Association-led coalition convinced a
majority of voters to reject term limits for judges.158
CONCLUSION
Most people want a neutral judge, one who will listen to both
sides of a case and respond in a fair manner.159  Whether the issue
is abortion, contract interpretation, or theft, litigants are entitled to
a judge who has not pre-judged the case.  Historically, courts were
intended to protect minorities when majoritarian interests, pro-
tected by the other two branches of government, threatened to de-
154. Paul Gerwitz & Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2005, at A19.
155. RULES GOVERNING COMMISSIONS, supra note 44, rule 2(i).
156. Sara Burnett, Fate of Several Initiatives Seen in ‘Dire Straits’, ROCKYMOUN-
TAINNEWS.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/elections/
article/0,2808,DRMN_24736_5007167,co.html.
157. See Limit the Judges, Campaign for Judicial Term Limits, http://www.limitthe
judges.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
158. Pankratz, supra note 147, at B-09.
159. TRAINING 2006, supra note 2, at 7.
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prive them of fair treatment.160  All of the methods that promote
public accountability for judges need to be limited when they be-
come no more than another means of expressing the views of the
majority, and thus weaken the ability of judges to hear each case
on its merits.
In Colorado, the independence of the judiciary needs to be pro-
tected, perhaps more than at any other time in the state’s history.
While public accountability is important, it is achieved through the
executive and legislative branches of the government.  The courts
function best if judges are free to decide each case without regard
to how the general public might put a thumb on the scales of jus-
tice.  To the degree that judicial performance commissions can pro-
tect judicial independence, while providing voters in retention
elections with sufficient information to make a decision about
whether a particular judge should be retained, Colorado’s model is
one that can prove helpful to other states.
160. Id.
